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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Rl'~~ELL
~-L:\B-6.-\

\V·. YOlTNG and
(). Yl)lTNG, his \vife,
. .4p pella11fs,
74~()

i~L\TIS 1-I.\XSl~~X

BOXXIE

and

H~~XSEN,

his \vife,

Respondents.

Brief of Respondents

This action, being No. 87,190 in the trial court, \Yas
commenced by plaintiffs in an attempt to relitigate, by
changes in allegations, the jssues \vhich had already hecn
presented and determined in case No. 85,678. In other
words, instead of appealing from the adverse decree antl
judgment in the original case, plaintiff attempted to
refile the case. Defendants, in their answer, pleaded the
findings of fact, conclusions of la\v and judgment in the
former case as res adjudicata of the issues and plaintiffs
thereupon interposed a demurrer and motion to strike;
1
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and at tlll' hearing stated to the court that in the event
the demurrer \vas overruled and the motion to strike
denied that a judgment of dismissal of the case would
be in order as they had no defense to those issues as
presented hy defendants.
rl1 ha t the t\\·o cases were the same is evident from a
reading <>f the pleadings. They both are an attempt on
the .part of plaintiffs to secure redress for what they

regard as a breach of contract on the part of defendants.
The contract is the same in each case; they arise out of
the sa.rne transaction ; the alleged breach is the same ; and
all issues as to rights and liabilities of the parties \vere
either raised in ihe first case or should or could have
been presented in that case. Of course, some of the
issues presented in the first ease were raised by the
ans-vver of defendants, but those issues were nevertheless
presente<l in the first case and determined by the court in
the first case.
Let us, therefore, take a look at the issues presented
in thP two cases.

FIRST CASE
Plan tiff's alleged legal ownership by defendants of
certain real property; that it vvas capable of being
farmed and of having pigs, ehickens and rabbits raised
thereon; and that defendants had urged plaintiffs to
move upon the property with defendants and enter into
a partnership with plaintiffs for operation of the farm.

2
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That on or about ~lay 14, 1948 plaintiffs and defendants made an oral contract that plaintiffs should pay
defendants $9000.00 for an undivided one-half interest in
the real property and personal property, including livestock thereon; that plaintiffs ,,,.ere to move on the· property with defendants and that the $9000.00 should be paid
'vhen plaintiffs sold their home at 3348 South State
Street, and if it 'vas not sold by Nov. 15, 1948, that plaintiffs were to pay $50.00 per month until it was sold, the
same to apply on the purchase priee; that there was a
$2,000 mortgage on defendants' farm, which defendants
""ere to clear, and upon payment of the $9,000 that the
one-half interest was to be clear.
That in July 1948 plaintiffs paid defendants $4,000,
securing the same by a mortgage on their State Street
house, whereupon it was alleged that the oral agreement
was modified and that the defendants were to immediately execute the deed for the one-half interest and exeeute a bill of sale for the one-half interest in the personal
property and execute a partnership agreement with
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also alleged that by certain minor
purchases they were to have an additional credit of
$60.00 on the purchase price.
It is further alleged that defendants did not g1ve
plaintiffs the deed and made excuses for their failure so
to do; that plaintiffs moved onto the property and performed their part of the partnership agreement by buying grain, etc., doing work in taking care of the livestock
and put in about 400 hours of labor upon the premises.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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That defendants agreed that if plaintiff would wait until
November 15, 1948 they would then execute deed and bill
of sale and have the other agreements drawn up. That on
or about February 15, 1949 defendants refused to execute the deeds and partnership agreement and refused to
execute any papers· carrying· out the agreement and demanded that plaintiffs leave the premises.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had breached the
contract and demanded damages as follows :
a.

For the sum of $4060.00.

b.

Interest thereon at 6%.

c. The value of the labor expended by Mr. Young
in the sum of $472.50.
d.

Cost of moving to the premises, $100.00..

e.

Moneys advanced f.or a saw, $53.00.

f.

Further moneys advanced in the sum of $161.37.

g.

Money advanced for purchase of a trailer, $16.00.

h. Money advanced to assist in payment of taxes,
$37.01.
1.

Cash advanced for payment of labor, $53.50.

Plaintiffs further alleged that they had demanded
payment from defendants of said amounts, but defendants had failed and defused to pay.

4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

By defendants' nns\Yer they admitted ow1ung the
real property; admitted that it \Vas eapnble of being
.. farmed; admitted that they discussed \Yith plaintiffs the
formation of a partnership; admitted making an oral
agTeement \Yith plaintiffs for the sale to plaintiffs of a
one-half interest in the real estate and personal property
for $9,000.00 to be paid on or before November 15, 1948;
admitted receipt of the $4,060 on the purchase price; admitted that the balance was to come from a sale of the
State Street home of plaintiffs but that the balance was
to be payable in any eYent on or before November 15,
1948; and alleged that in the meantime it was a part of
the agreement that they would operate the farm as a
joint enterprise and sell and dispose of the products, contributing equally in labor and cost of the operations and
dividing equally the net proceeds. Defendants further
admitted that the farm had a mortgage on it in the sum
of $1600.00, and that they were to convey the one-half
interest free and clear of lien and that they used a
portion of the $4,000 received from plaintiffs to clear the
mortgage. Defendants admitted that plaintiffs had gone
into possession of an apartment on the premises, and alleged that the parties had operated the farm as a j'oint
enterprise and had sold the livestock and chickens and
other salable products and had applied the proceeds to
the expenses of operations and had equally divided the
balance. Defendants denied that the contract was modified in July 1948, as alleged by plaintiffs, and alleged
that it was understood and agreed at that time that the
balance of the purchase price was to be paid on or about
November 15, 1948. On the other hand defendants alleged
5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that when November 15, 1948 came the- plaintiffs failed
and refused to pay the balance- of the purchase price and
breached the agreement in that regard and then
and there notified defendants that they did not
intend to pay the balance and did not intend to go ahead
with the formation of the partnership and did not intend
to engage in the joint operation of the farm, and did not
inte·nd to render any further services in the operation
of the farm, and did not intend to and would not be responsible for any further debts or obligations which
might be incurred for the restocking of the farm with
livestock or poultry, and on the contrary demanded that
they be reimbursed for their expenditures and that
$4,000 be returned to them.
Defendants denied that they had breached the contract as alleged by plaintiffs and alleged that the· contract
was breached by plaintiffs and alleged that plaintiffs had
breached the contract by failing and refusing to pay the
balance on the purchase price and by repudiating the
agreement and by refusing to further ·participate in the
operation of the farm. That if plaintiffs were damaged
it was due to their own misconduct in breaching the contract and in refusing to go ahead and in demanding a
return of their invested funds.
Upon these issues the case was tried. T_he issues
were found in favor of defendants and findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment were entered, all of
which are made a part of the answer of defendants in
the second case.
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SECOND CASE
Thereupon the plaintiffs, before and instead of appealing as they haYe no'v done in the first case, filed a
second case.
The only difference between the second case and the
first case is that plaintiffs allege in the· second case that
a partnership 'Yas formed by the agreement in May, 1948.
That the real and personal property belonged to the
partnership. That plaintiffs paid the sum of $4,060.00 on
the purchase price of a one-half interest in the partnership, the balance to be payable on or about Nov. 15, 1948
from the sale of their State Street home, and if not sold
by Nov. 15, 1948 that the balance was to be payable a~ the
rate of $50.00 per month, and that in the- meantime the
plaintiff ''as to receive a deed and bill of sale for the· onehalf interest, and that defendants refused to make the
deed, bill of sale, and prepare and execute the necessary
partnership papers. That it is impossible for the parties
to settle their differences and the personal property of
the partnership has been sold and no accounting had.
They pray for a dissolution of the partnership and an
accounting had; that the partnership property be sold
and that the surplus be divided between the parties.
To this complaint in the second case the defendants
interposed the same defenses which were pleaded in the
first case and in addition pleaded res adjudicata, attaching copies of the pleadings, findings of fact and judgment
in the first case to the answer.

7
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When plaintiffs' demurrer to the defense of res
adjudicata was overruled and their motion to strike that
defense was denied they stated that they could not go to
trial and that a judgment of dismissal of the second case
was in order and appropriate in view of the decision of
the court on the demurrer and motion.
This appeal is from the order of the court in overruling the demurrer of plaintiffs to the plea of res adjudicata and from the order of the court in denying the
motion to strike the same., and upon that basis in entering
the judgment of dismissal thereon.
Plaintiff's position, as we understand it, is that the
trial court erred in overruling the demurrer and in denying the motion to strike. Since the judgment of dismissal
was entered at their own suggestion after the court had
so ruled, they are not appealing from the action of the trial
court in dismis~ing the case after making the ruling. In
other words, they regard the issue of res adjudicata ~s a
complete defense if it is good, and if it is not good it has
no place in the answer.
The question, then, is as to whether the first case, on
the issues framed by the pleadings and the findings of
fact, conclusions of law and judgment on thos·e issues,
stands as an adjudication of the rights of the parties,
subject only to the right of appeal in the first case.

8
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POINT I
RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS ACTION.
ARGU~fENT

The only difference bet,veen the two cases is the
change of position taken by plaintiffs. In the first ease
they alleged the oral contract in 1\lay, 1948, said that it
'vas for purchase of a one half interest in the real propert:~ a.n~ for the formation of a partnership, the terms to
be later agreed upon, "'"hen the payments were to be
made, w·hat "~as done and to be done by the respective
parties; that the defendants breached the contract and
that they wanted their money back plus damages for the
breach. Defendants pleaded the May, 1948 contract, what
was done and to be done by the parties thereunder, the
relationship of the parties under the. contract, what was
done with the jointly owned personal property, who
breached the contract and denied any liability to plaintiffs for any breach of the contract and alleged that the
plaintiffs were the wrong-doers.
In the second case the plaintiffs allege the same contract, the same payments by themselves, the same
breaches by defendants, and the same facts as those alleged in the first case, excepting that in the second case
they allege that the contract was not one of purchase
and sale of real and personal property with ali agreement
to make a partnership, as alleged in the first case, but
was in fact a partnership agreement.
In both cases the issues were: What was the agreement between the parties; "\vha.t was their relationship;
what became of the property; who breached the agreeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment; what are the liabilities of the parties by reason thereof~
All of those matters were fully litigated in the first
case and all of those issues were presented by the pleadings and dete-rmined by the court in the first case.
It will be observed by the court that in the first
case plaintiffs alleged when the partnership was to be
formed and how the parties were to operate until the
plaintiffs paid the $9,000 in full. Defendants, by their
pleadings in the first case, likewise pleaded when the
partnership was to be formed, how they were to operate
pending payment of the one-half interest, what the relationship of the parties was, what the parties did with the
personal property which they jointly owned and disposed
of; and where the breach occurred. All of those issues
were heard and determined in the first case.
Plaintiffs now contend that they can relitigate those
same issues by changing their position in the second case
from a contract for purchase and sale of real and personal property, with an agreement to make a partnership in the future, to a position that the partnership was
formed in the first instance and with the real and personal property as partnership property.
In other words, plaintiffs contend that they can
relitigate an action for breach of contract, involving a
construction of the contract, and involving the rights and
liabilities of the parties arising out of the contract and
the alleged breaches thereof, as often as the parties
10
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change their minds as to what their relationship really
'YaS.
Such is not the la"" in the State of Utah.
When a party to a contract decides. that his rights
thereunder have been violated and that he is entitled to
damages for its breach, and when both parties plead
fully with reference to all of the issues thereunder, that
ends the matter excepting for a motion for new trial and
appeal. You cannot take as many bites of the apple as
your change of whim or second guessing or more mature
reflection suggests. If such were not the case litigation
would never end and rights and liabilities would never
come to rest between the parties.
This court has so held in many cases.
We shall not burden the court with all of the decisions of this court on the subject. The doctrine of res
adjudicata is, of course, comprehended within' the rule
against splitting causes of action. Section 104-6-1, Chapter 6, U.C.A. 1943, provides that the pleadings are the
formal allegations of the parties of their respective
claims and defenses for the judgment of the court.
Sec. 104-7-2 provides what the complaint shall cont3:in, including a statement of the fac.ts constituting the
cause of action of plaintiff, and the demand for relief
which he claims.
Sec. 104-7-3 provides that a plaintiff may join in the
same complaint as many causes of action as he feels that
11
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he has arising out of the same transaction or transactions,
legal and equitable, including actions upon contract,
express or implied, and including also claims to real and
personal property and damages for the withholding
thereof. He may plead in the alternative or set up his
cause of action in separate counts.
Section 104-9-1 provides what the answer shall contain, including allegations of new matter and counterclaims.
Section 104-9-3 provides that if the defendant fails
to set up in his counterclaim in all matters pertaining to
the subje:ct matter of the action or arising out of the same
transaction that he and his assignees are thereafter
barred from asserting the same.
Liberal provisions are made in Chapter 14, Section
104-14-1, 104-14-2, 104-14-3 and 104-14-4 for the amendment of pleadings. A plaintiff may even dismiss his ease
and start over, if, as here, no counterclaim has been pleaded, at any time before the case is submitted and decided.
All of those provisions are for the purpose of having cases fully presented, fully litigated in one proceeding, and then set at rest, subject only to a motion for new
trial, one of the grounds of which is newly discovered
evidence, and he may thereafter appeal.
What is the value of all of this if it results in nothing-no adjudication that is binding on the parties-no
determination of the issues involved, no finality that can12
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not be undone by the simple method of plaintiff changing
his position or his view as to his relationship under the
contract?
The general rule is well stated in 30 Am. Juris. 920925, as follows :
Section 178 (Judgments)
''It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that material facts or questions which were
in issue in a former action, and were there admitted or judicially determined, are conclusively
settled by a judgment rendered therein, and that
such facts or questions become res judicata and
may not again be litigated in a subsequent action
between the same parties or their privies, regardless of the form the issue may take in the subsequent action whether the subsequent action
involves the same or a different form of
proceeding, or whether the second action is
upon the same or a different cause of action, subject matter, claim, or demand, as the earlier action.
In such cases, it is also immaterial that the two
actions are based on different grounds, or tried
on different theories, or instituted for different
p'ltrposes and seek different relief."
Section 179.
''The phase of the doctrine of res judicata
precluding subsequent litigation of the same cause
of action is much broader in its application than
a determination of the questions involved in the
prior action; the conclusiveness of the judgment in
such case extends not only to matters actually
determined, but also to other matters which could
properly have been determined in the prior action.
This rule applies to every question falling within
the purview of the original action, in respect to
matters of both claim and defense, which could

13
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have been presented by the exercise of due diligence.''
These principles are also recognized and established ·
by decisions of this court.
The- most recent case is Matthews v. Matthews, 102
Utah 428, 132 Pac. 2d 111. The case involved rights and
defenses arising out of purported contracts, relationships, releases and conveyances, all of which had been
before the court in a former case. This court sustained
the plea of res adjudicata in the following language:
"In his brief on appeal, appellant enumerates
several contentions, but they are all resolved in
the question of res adjudicata. A careful examination of the record herein and the decision in the
cases of Klein v. Matthews and Matthews et al v.
Garcia, reported jointly in 99 Utah 398, 106 P.
2d 773, discloses that the property described and
the subject matter referred to in plaintiff's complaint in this action is the same property and the
same subject matter involved in both of these
cases; that the plaintiff Klein in the former action
is the same person as the defendant Maud E.
Garcia in the case at bar; that the relationship of
, attorney and client previously existing between
plaintiff herein and the defendant Orson Heber
Matthews was considered and ruled upon in the
above reported case; and that, in view of the judgment of nonsuit against this plantiff and in favor
of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, defendant herein, the matters in controversy between
Cecil B. Matthews, Orson Heber Matthews and
· Maud E. G·arcia, also known as Maud E. Garcia
Klein, attempted to be re-li tiga ted in this action,
were definitely decided and set at rest in the
former cases.
14
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'' 'The judgment of a court of concurrent
jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea,
a bar, or as eYidence, conclusive, bet,Yeen the same
parties, upon the same matter directly in question
in another court.' 15 R. C. L. 951, Sec. 429.
'' 'The foundation principle upon which the
doctrine of res juriciata rests is that parties ought
not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more
than once; that, when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court. of
competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for
such trial has been given, the judgment of the
court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity
''ith them in la'v or estate. * * * Public policy and
the interest of litigants alike require that there
be an end to litigatiton, and the peace and order
of society demand that matters distinctly put in
issue and deter1nined by a court of competent
jurisdiction as to parties and subject matter shall
not be retried bettveen the same parties in any
subsequent suit in. any court.' 15 R. C. L. 953,
Sec. 430. ''
Utah Builders Supply Co. v. Gardner, 86 Utah 250,
39 Pac. 2d 327. The question involved in the case was
''Thether a homestead exemption had to be claimed in the
original case where the propery was sold or whether it
could be claimed in a subsequent case. While this couit
held that a homestead right could be claimed in either
proceeding under our statute it announced the general
law as follows:
"It is undoubtedly the general rule, as urged
by respondent, that a valid judgment for plaintiff
is concl~tsive not only as to defenses which are set
up and a.djudicaterl, but also as to those ttvhich
15
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might have been raised, so that a defendant can
neither set up such defense in a second action
between the same parties nor in a further proceeding in the same action. Everill v. S"ran, 20
Utah 56, 57 P. 716; 34 C. J. 856, 859."
The case of Logan City v. Utah Power & Light Company is squarely in point on this subject. In that case
Logan City was attempting to avoid the legal effect of a
decree construing and interpreting a former adjudication
of its water rights in Logan River. There, as here, plaintiff was attemptitng to contend that there were certain
issues which were not litigated and determined in the
former case and that they should have the right to present the case upon the changed theory. In both decisions
this court held that ''the interests of society ·demand that
there shall be a termination to every controversy" and
that the plea of res adjudicata was properly sustained.
In the first decision, 86 Utah 340, 16 Pac. 2d 1097,
the following language is used :

'' * * * A leading case supporting such rule is
that of United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S.
61, 65, 25 L. Ed. 93. It is there said that:
'' 'There are no maxims of the law more firmly established, or of more value in the administration of justice, than the two which are designed
to prevent repeated litigation between the same
parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; namely, interest rei publicae, ut sit finis
litium, and nemo debet bis vexari pro una et
eadam causa.
" 'If the court has been mistaken in the la\v,
there is a remedy by writ of error. If the jury has
16
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been mistaken in the facts, the remedy is by motion for ne".. trinl. If there has been evidence diseoYered since the trial, a motion for a new trial
"""ill give appropriate relief. But all these are
parts of the same proeeeding, relief is given in the
same suit, and the party is not vexed by another
suit for the same matter. So in a suit in chancery
on proper showing a rehearing is granted. If the
injury complained of is an erroneous decision,
an appeal to a higher court gives opportunity to
correct the error. If new evidence is discovered
after the decree has become final, a bill of review
on that ground may be filed within the rules
prescribed by law on that subject. Here, again,
these proceedings are ail part of the same suit,
and the rule framed for the repose of society· is
not violated.
'' 'But there is an admitted exception to this
general rule in cases where, by reason· of something done by the successful party to a suit, there
was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the
issue in the case. Where the unsuccessful party
has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case,
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, as by keeping him away. from court,
a false promise of a compromise; or where the
defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or
where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest
to the other side--these, and similar cases which
sho\v that there has never been a real contest in
the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for
which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and
annul the former judgment or deccree, and open
the case for a new and a fair hearing. See Wells,

17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Res Adjudicata., Sect. 499; Pearce v. Olney, 20
Conn. 544; Wierich v. DeZoya, 7 Ill. (2 Gilman)
385; Kent v. Richards, 3 Md. Ch. 392; Smith v.
Lowry, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 320; DeLouis et al. v.
Meek et al., 2 Iowa (G. Green), 55 (50 Am. Dee.
491).' "
In the decision after rehearing 86 Utah 354, 44 Pac.
2d. 698, this court announced the law in the following
language:
"As to the claimed right of Logan City to
litigate in the instant case matters which it could
have litigated in case No. 3055, this court and the
courts generally are likewise committed to a doctrine contrary to plaintiffs' contention.
In the case of Peay v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah,
331, 40 P. 206, 208, this court said : 'The defendant can only be called upon to answer the material
allegations of the complaint, and upon such allegations the- issue is formed, and, when judgment is
rendered thereon by a court of exclusive jurisdiction, it is conclusive between the parties, upon
the same rna tters, unless set aside- by a court of
last resort. And such a judg1nent is final, not
only as to the matter actually determined, but
also as to every other matter which might have
been litigated by the parties, as part of the sub·ject in controversy, but uJhich was omitted from
the case through negligence, or inadvertence, or
even accident.' ''
The case of Badger v. Badger, 69 Utah 293, 254 Pac.
784, announces the same law with reference to splitting
causes of action, in the following language:
"It is a well-settled rule of law, under both
common-law and the Code system of pleading, that
18
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a party having one entire demand cannot split
the demand up into separate causes of action. 1
Sutherland, Code Prar. and Forms, sec. 218;
('iooley Y- t_lalnvcrns County, 121 Cal. 482, 53 P.
1075; lr. S. Y. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 65, 25 L. Ed.
93; 1 C. J. 1006; 1 Van Fleet's Former Adjudications, 204. In fact, as stated in the case of U. S.
Y. Throckmorton, supra:
'' 'There are no maxims of the law more
firmly established or of more value in the administration of justice than the two which are designed
to prevent repeated litigat1on between the same
parties in regard to the same subject of controversy, namely: Interest rei publicae, ut sit finis
litium, and nemo (debet) bis vexa.ri pro una et
eadem causa.'
''To this well-established general rule, however, there are exceptions. If a person by accident,
excusable neglect, or mistake, or by fraud on the
part of his adversary and without any fault of the
pleader, splits a single cause of action, an adjudication in respect to one will not bar a suit upon the
other. 1 Van Fleet's Former Adjudications, 206;
1 C. J. 1009, and cases there cited. If, however,
the pleader is in possession of the means of ascertaining the full extent of his claim, and his failure
to do so is due to his own fault or neglect, it
would seem that upon both principle and authority
the general rule against splitting applies. Macon,
etc., R. R. Co. v. Gerrard, 54 Ga. 327."
Plaintiffs in this case did not attempt to bring themselves -writhin any exceptions to the general law. They
simply decided to relitigate the case on a different theory.
The most recent case on the subject is East Mill
Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159
19
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Pac. 2d 863. This case is cited by appellant as authority
for the idea that res adjudicata applies only to issues
actually presented and tried. Apparently the case was
not carefully read or understood by appellants. It is
authority for no such thing. In fact it sustains the principles which defendants contend to be the la\v. That there
are factual conditions to which the law does not apply
is granted, but the case at bar is not such a case. The
Salt Lake City case was such a ease. In that case there
had been an adjudication between the parties as to the
rights of the water users under an exchange agreement.
The prior adjudication had only to do with an interpretation of the rights during the period prior to the installation of individual meters. It \vas an action for declaratory judgment. Thereafter the meters were installed and
a further dispute arose as to the interpretation of the
contract as applied to that situation. The city contended
that the former declaratory judgment on one phase of the
case was a bar to any further declaratory judgment relating to the exchange rights. This court very properly
held that the one declaratory judgment was not conclusive of an issue or controversy which was not in existence
and which could not hav:e been presented. In doing so
this court used the language quoted by counsel for plaintiffs, which, if lifted from the context of the case, might
tend to mislead; but when read as applied to that pa.rticular case involving a declaration of rights as applied to
a pa.rticular dispute is easily understood. In that case
the general law was again announced by this court in
most understandable language as follows:
20
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''This contention overlooks the fact that there
are t'Yo kinds of cases where the doctrine of res judicata is applied: In the one the former action
is an absolute bar to the ·maintena.nce of the
second: it usually bars the successf~tl party as well
as the loser; it must be between the same parties
or their pril'1:es; it applies not only to points and
issues which are actually raised a.nd decided therein but also to such as co~tld have been therein adjudicated, but it only applies where the claim,
demand or cause of action is the same in both
cases. The courts hold that the parties should litigate their entire claim, demand and cause of aotion, and every part, issue and ground thereof, and
if one of the parties fails to raise any p~oint or
issue or to litigate any part of his claim, demand
or cause of action a;nd the matter goes to fina.l
judgment, such party may not aga.in litigate that
claim, demand or cause of action or any issue,
point or part thereof which he could have but
failed to litigate in the former action. On the other
hand where the claim, demand, or cause of action
is different in the two cases then the former is
res judicata of the latter only to the extent that
the former actually raised and decided the same
points and issues which are raised in the latter.
Harding Company v. Harding, 352 Ill. 417, 186
N. E. 152, 88 A.L.R. 563, and note thereto; Outram
v. Morewood, 3 East 346, 102 Eng. Reprint 630;
Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. Ed.
195, 30 Am. Jur. 923; 'Judgments', section 179
and 180; 38 Yale Law Journal (1928-29) 299, at
311 'Res Judicata' by Robert von Moschzisker.
This distinction has been followed by this court
although not expressly pointed out. Everill v.
Swan, 20 Utah 56, 57 P. 716; Glen Allen Mining
Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 296
P. 231; Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P. 2d 699;
Logan City v. Utah Power & Light Co., 86 Utah
21
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340, 16 P. 2d 1097, on rehearing, 86 Utah 354, 44 P.
2d 698; State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, at page 422,
120 P. 2d 285, at page 315."
If the law of this State were as contended for by
plaintiff every plaintiff or defendant in any case involving property or personal injuries could reli tiga te his case
by simply adding a new theory or changing his position
regardless of the legal ethics involved. It would open the
door to confusion and chicanery.
There are some other cases from this court whicb. we
refrain from citing because they add nothing to what
has been so recently reiterated by this court. There are,
however, some decisions from other jurisdictions which
apply to factual conditions similar to the case at bar.
We cite them as added authority. Daluiso v. Nicassio,
(Cal.) 107 Pac. 2d 460:
Action filed in 1935 alleging that plaintiff and defendant orally agreed to go into partnership in building
and operation of a winery and asked for ''an adjudication of the existence of the said co-partnership and of the
respective rights" of the parties for a dissolution and
accounting, and other and further relief. Defendant
denied all claims and set up an affirmative defense showing a written agreement constituting full satisfaction of
·all claims against him. The court found that the allegations of the affirmative defense were true. In 1936 plain. tiff filed another action whereby he sought to recover
$8000.00 for services and material furnished during the
course of said alleged co-partnership, on the basis that
he had mistakenly believed that he was a partner of the
22
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defendant. Other causes of (H·tion sought rpeovcry on
quantum meruit and aeeounts stated. The meaning a11d
effect of the aforesaid \Yritten agreement \vas attempted
to be put into issue. The court said :

··:\I oreover, the meaning and a.ff ect of that
agreement has been adjudicated in another action
\Yhere the same result \vas reached. In l)rice v.
Sixth Dist. Agricultural .A.ss 'u., 201 Cal 502, 238
P. 387, 390, the court quotes '"·ith approval from
Freeman on Judgments as follo,vs : 'If the existence, validity or construction of a contract, lease,
conveyanee or other obligation has been adjudicated in one action it is res judicata when it comes
again in issue in another action betvveen the same
parties, though the immediate subject-matter of
the t\vo actions be different.' The court then said :
In other words, when an issue has been litigated
all inquiry respecting the same is foreclosed, not
only as to matters heard, but also as to matters
that could have been heard in support of or 111
opposition thereto.' ''
Poarch et ai v. Finkelstein, (Okla.) 99 Pac. 2d 871:
Where, in an injunction suit, the ovvnership of thP
personar property is made an issue under the pleadings,
and that issue along with the question of right to injunctive relief is litigated on the trial, and it is finally decided that the writ \vas wrongfully issued, it is not error
in an action between the same parties on the injunction
bond to exclude testimony of the defendants therein relative to the ownership of the property in issue in the injunction case.
" 'When a fact has been determined in the
course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judg·ment has been rendered in accordance there\vith,
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it cannot be again litigated between the same
parties wthout virtually impeaching the correctness of the former decision, which, from motives
of public policy, the law does not permit to be
done. rrhe estoppel is not confined to the judgment, hut extends to all facts involved in it as
necessary steps or the groundwork upon which
it must haYe been founded. It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis on which it
stands, upon the obvious principle that, where a
conclusion is indisputable and could have been
dra\Yn only from certain premises, the premises
are equally indisputable with the conclusion.
,Johnson v. Gillett, 66 Okl. 308, 168 P. 1031; Adams
v. State ex rel. l\1othersead, Bartk Com'r, 133 Okl.
194, 271 ·p. 946.' ''
Rn1ith v. Schuler-I{nox Co., (Cal.) 192 Pac. 2d 34:
Plaintiffs realty \vas purchased at an execution sale
111 satisfaction of a judgment and judgment rendered
against plaintiffs in purchasers quiet title suit; plaintiff's right of redemption and to any moneys previously
expended for improvements while plaintiffs retained possession were interests in the realty "\vhich should have
been alleged and proved, and failure to do so constituted
a \Yaiver of the issues ancl judgment was res judicata as
to such issues.
''It has been repeatedly determined that res
judie a ta applies not only to the issues which were
actually pleaded and determined by the former
judgment, but also to all issues which could have
been properly tendered and determined thereby.
(Slater v. Shell Oil Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 864, 868,
137 P. 2d 713; De Hart v. Allen, 26 Cal. 2d 829, 161
P. 2d 453; l{rier v. l{rier, 28 Cal. 2d 841, 172 P.
2d 681; Brunswig Drug Co. v. Springer, 66 Cal.
A.pp. 2d 444, 450, 130 P. 2d 7fj8.)
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1
''

hat w·e haYe stated also disposes of the citations
contained in plaintiffs brief .
.A. s to the citation from 30 Am. Juris. 946 with reference

to misconception of remedy, we simply say that plaintiffs
did not misconceive any remedy. They wanted their
money back because they did not want to go ahead with
the deal and they brought an action for breach of contract, which they could not prove. They made certain allegations "rith reference to the contract, what it was, and
what the relationship of the parties was, and particularly
alleged the partnership matter. Defendant did likewise,
and thereafter the partnership matter was tried and
adjudicated; and then they tried to bring the second case
upon a completely different. allegation as to the effect of
the same contract and the same transaction. That hasn't
anything to do with a misconception of remedy and a
reading of the cases in the foot note discloses no such
authority for the proposition plaintiffs attempted in
this case.
We respectfully submit that the plea of res adjudicata was properly interposed and the trial court was
correct in its ruling overrulling the demurrer and in
denying the motion to strike. If plaintiffs ever had any
remedy it was by motion for new trial and ap·peal in the
original case. It certainly was not by refiling.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH AND ELTON,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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